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 <title>All Content Related to Saudi Arabia</title>
 <link>http://opennet.net/country/saudi-arabia</link>
 <description>The taxonomy view with a depth of 0.</description>
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<item>
 <title>Saudi Arabia</title>
 <link>http://opennet.net/research/profiles/saudi-arabia</link>
 <description>&lt;h2&gt;Background&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Saudi Arabia is a monarchy without elected political institutions.&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref1_lw6gr84&quot; title=&quot;//www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61698.htm. &quot; href=&quot;#footnote1_lw6gr84&quot;&gt;1&lt;/a&gt; The ruling Al Saud family has presided over the Islamic nation and accumulated a poor human rights record. At times there has been increased discussion of sensitive subjects, such as political reform and women’s rights. Despite explicit promises to improve the human rights situation, however, the government continues to maintain that such rights are subordinate to Islamic law and tightly limits political and religious freedom.&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref2_jnuzpib&quot; title=&quot;//www.amnestyusa.org/countries/saudi_arabia/document.do?id=ar&amp;amp;yr=20.... &quot; href=&quot;#footnote2_jnuzpib&quot;&gt;2&lt;/a&gt; Religious police, &lt;em&gt;Mutawwa’in&lt;/em&gt;, are charged with enforcing public morality. A wide range of media, including books and films, are censored or banned.  Arbitrary arrests, prolonged detentions of political prisoners, corporal punishment, and the denial of basic conditions for fair trials make for a bleak judicial landscape.&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref3_k7jie9i&quot; title=&quot;//www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61698.htm. &quot; href=&quot;#footnote3_k7jie9i&quot;&gt;3&lt;/a&gt; Journalism is strictly controlled and journalists must exercise self-censorship in order to avoid government scrutiny and dismissal.&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref4_76khc30&quot; title=&quot;//www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=20775&amp;amp;Valider=OK. &quot; href=&quot;#footnote4_76khc30&quot;&gt;4&lt;/a&gt; Most Saudis get their information from foreign television and the Internet, and—though officially banned—dish receivers are becoming increasingly common.&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref5_ry74j2a&quot; title=&quot;//www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=17185. &quot; href=&quot;#footnote5_ry74j2a&quot;&gt;5&lt;/a&gt; Al-Jazeera, a Qatar-based Arab satellite television station, is banned in the country, and foreign journalists are rarely granted visas.&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref6_3y5bco1&quot; title=&quot;Ibid.&quot; href=&quot;#footnote6_3y5bco1&quot;&gt;6&lt;/a&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Internet in Saudi Arabia&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The belated arrival of the Internet in Saudi Arabia several years after its introduction into other Arab countries, was largely the result of the government’s concerns about regulating content. Since the year 2000, Internet usage has increased from less than 1 percent to more than 10 percent (over 2.5 million users) of the population.&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref7_ry24ubc&quot; title=&quot;//www.internetworldstats.com/stats5.htm#me. &quot; href=&quot;#footnote7_ry24ubc&quot;&gt;7&lt;/a&gt; Telecom companies have begun taking advantage of the still relatively low penetration rate by unveiling 3G networks in the country.&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref8_z0kw6w4&quot; title=&quot;//www.w2forum.com/i/Telecom_industry_sees_3G_boom_in_Saudi_Arabia. &quot; href=&quot;#footnote8_z0kw6w4&quot;&gt;8&lt;/a&gt; The government’s Internet Services Unit (ISU), a department of the King Abdulaziz City for Science &amp;amp; Technology (KACST), has been responsible for overseeing Internet services in Saudi Arabia and for implementing government censorship.&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref9_8n3pbyj&quot; title=&quot;//www.isu.net.sa/. &quot; href=&quot;#footnote9_8n3pbyj&quot;&gt;9&lt;/a&gt; As its Web site explains, twenty-one licensed Internet service providers (ISPs) and one more not yet in service connect users to the national network.&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref10_lokddef&quot; title=&quot;Ibid.&quot; href=&quot;#footnote10_lokddef&quot;&gt;10&lt;/a&gt; The ISU manages the link from the national network to international networks.&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref11_ft7yhyq&quot; title=&quot;Ibid.&quot; href=&quot;#footnote11_ft7yhyq&quot;&gt;11&lt;/a&gt;  In accordance with a Council of Ministers decision, the Saudi Communications Commission was renamed the Communications and Information Technology Commission (CTIC) and took charge of licensing and filtering processes previously managed by KACST. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Blogging has grown as a medium for expression in Saudi Arabia, with the number of bloggers tripling to an estimated 2,000.&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref12_3zsrz5d&quot; title=&quot;//www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/11/AR200611.... &quot; href=&quot;#footnote12_3zsrz5d&quot;&gt;12&lt;/a&gt; Half of these bloggers are women.&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref13_tp7r4z9&quot; title=&quot;Ibid.&quot; href=&quot;#footnote13_tp7r4z9&quot;&gt;13&lt;/a&gt;  In 2005 the government tried to ban the country’s primary blogging tool, blogger.com.&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref14_6mhh3rk&quot; title=&quot;//www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=20775&amp;amp;Valider=OK. &quot; href=&quot;#footnote14_6mhh3rk&quot;&gt;14&lt;/a&gt; However, after a few days the ban was lifted, with the censors choosing to block specific content on the blogging Web site instead.&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref15_7xqbgmz&quot; title=&quot;Ibid.&quot; href=&quot;#footnote15_7xqbgmz&quot;&gt;15&lt;/a&gt; Paralleling the increase in Internet use has been a proliferation of Internet cafés. As hourly rates can be too expensive for average Saudis, some Internet cafés offer monthly subscriptions that are more affordable.&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref16_oagg11z&quot; title=&quot; Internet/Cyber Cafes,” http://baheyeldin.com/saisp/0006-cafes.phtml. &quot; href=&quot;#footnote16_oagg11z&quot;&gt;16&lt;/a&gt; From time to time, the authorities have shut down Internet cafés for reasons such as “immoral purposes.”&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref17_pt400zr&quot; title=&quot;//www.hrw.org/wr2k1/mideast/saudi.html. &quot; href=&quot;#footnote17_pt400zr&quot;&gt;17&lt;/a&gt;  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Legal and regulatory frameworks&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The government of Saudi Arabia allowed public access to the Internet only after it was satisfied that an adequate regulatory framework could be put in place.  The authorities use Secure Computing’s SmartFilter software for technical implementation and to identify sites for blocking.&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref18_4npz2y7&quot; title=&quot;//www.opennetinitiative.net/studies/saudi/#toc1c.&quot; href=&quot;#footnote18_4npz2y7&quot;&gt;18&lt;/a&gt; Furthermore, the expertise of local staff and input of ordinary citizens aid the filtering regime. The government makes no secret of its filtering, which is explained on a section of the ISU Web site.&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref19_tfhp4yr&quot; title=&quot;//www.isu.net.sa/saudi-internet/contenet-filtring/filtring.htm. &quot; href=&quot;#footnote19_tfhp4yr&quot;&gt;19&lt;/a&gt; According to this Web site, KACST is directly responsible for filtering pornographic content, while other sites are blocked upon request from “government security bodies.”  The Web site also has forms by which Internet users can request that certain sites be blocked or unblocked.  It has been noted by a KACST official that the majority of blocked Web sites contain pornographic content, and over 90 percent of Internet users have tried to access a blocked Web site.”&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref20_0bgobnw&quot; title=&quot;//www.arabnews.com/?page=1&amp;amp;section=0&amp;amp;article=71012&amp;amp;d=2&amp;amp;m=10&amp;amp;y=2005. &quot; href=&quot;#footnote20_0bgobnw&quot;&gt;20&lt;/a&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In 2001 the Council of Ministers issued a resolution outlining content that Internet users are prohibited from accessing and publishing.&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref21_2dkhxdh&quot; title=&quot;//www.al-bab.com/media/docs/saudi.htm. &quot; href=&quot;#footnote21_2dkhxdh&quot;&gt;21&lt;/a&gt;  Among other things, it forbids content “breaching public decency,” material “infringing the sanctity of Islam,” and “anything contrary to the state or its system.”&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref22_x4zqhff&quot; title=&quot;Ibid.&quot; href=&quot;#footnote22_x4zqhff&quot;&gt;22&lt;/a&gt; The resolution also includes approval requirements for publishing on the Internet and mechanical guidelines for service providers on recording and monitoring users’ activities.&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref23_94cs9j9&quot; title=&quot;Ibid.&quot; href=&quot;#footnote23_94cs9j9&quot;&gt;23&lt;/a&gt;    &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A new law, approved by the Saudi Shoura (Advisory) Council in October 2006, criminalizes the use of the Internet to defame or harm individuals and the development of Web sites that violate Saudi laws or Islamic values, or that serve terrorist organizations.&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref24_28p29xg&quot; title=&quot;//www.arabnews.com/?page=1&amp;amp;section=0&amp;amp;article=87941&amp;amp;d=10&amp;amp;m=10&amp;amp;y=2006. &quot; href=&quot;#footnote24_28p29xg&quot;&gt;24&lt;/a&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;ONI testing results&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Testing was conducted on two ISPs: National Engineering Services &amp;amp; Marketing (Nesma) and Arabian Internet and Communications Services (Awalnet). Both providers blocked the same Web sites, as expected given the centrally administered filtering system. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Testing indicates that the Web sites of Saudi political reformist and opposition groups, such as the Islah movement (&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.islah.tv&quot; title=&quot;www.islah.tv&quot;&gt;www.islah.tv&lt;/a&gt;) and the Tajdeed movement (tagdeed.net), are targeted for blocking. In keeping with the Saudi government’s emphasis on protecting the “sanctity of Islam”&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref25_aa33ec0&quot; title=&quot;//www.al-bab.com/media/docs/saudi.htm. &quot; href=&quot;#footnote25_aa33ec0&quot;&gt;25&lt;/a&gt;—and the legitimacy of the regime—sites relating to minority faiths or espousing alternative views of Islam are blocked. These include the Web sites of a number of local Shiite groups.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Web pages of a few global free speech advocates, such as Article19 (&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.article19.org&quot; title=&quot;www.article19.org&quot;&gt;www.article19.org&lt;/a&gt;) and the Free Speech Coalition (&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.freespeechcoalition.com&quot; title=&quot;www.freespeechcoalition.com&quot;&gt;www.freespeechcoalition.com&lt;/a&gt;), are blocked. However, filtering of human rights content primarily targets Saudi or regional organizations. All Web pages of the Saudi Human Rights Center (&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.saudihr.org&quot; title=&quot;www.saudihr.org&quot;&gt;www.saudihr.org&lt;/a&gt;) are blocked. Although the main pages of the Arab Human Rights Information Network and the Arabic rights organization Humum are accessible, the Saudi sections of the two sites, &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.hrinfo.net/ifex/alerts/saudi&quot; title=&quot;http://www.hrinfo.net/ifex/alerts/saudi&quot;&gt;http://www.hrinfo.net/ifex/alerts/saudi&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.humum.net/country/saudi.shtml&quot; title=&quot;http://www.humum.net/country/saudi.shtml&quot;&gt;http://www.humum.net/country/saudi.shtml&lt;/a&gt;, are not. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Most global media sites tested, including Israel-based news outlets such as the daily Haaretz (&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.haaretz.com&quot; title=&quot;www.haaretz.com&quot;&gt;www.haaretz.com&lt;/a&gt;), were accessible. However, the Arab-language news sites Al-Quds Al Arabi (&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.alquds.co.uk&quot; title=&quot;www.alquds.co.uk&quot;&gt;www.alquds.co.uk&lt;/a&gt;) and Elaph (&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.elaph.com&quot; title=&quot;www.elaph.com&quot;&gt;www.elaph.com&lt;/a&gt;) are blocked. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;“Immoral” social content continues to be a priority target for Saudi censors.  Over 90 percent of pornographic Web sites and most sites featuring provocative attire or gambling that were tested were blocked. Numerous sites relating to alcohol and drugs, gays and lesbians, and sex-education and family planning were also inaccessible. This pervasive filtering of social content is achieved through the use of SmartFilter software, which builds “blacklists” of sites from user-selected categories, such as Drugs, Gambling, Obscene, Nudity, Sex, and Dating. The substantial filtering of Internet tools, including anonymizers and translators, in Saudi Arabia is also achieved in this manner. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Conclusion&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Saudi Arabia maintains a sophisticated filtering regime. Social content and Web-based applications are extensively filtered using commercial software. Additional political and religious sites are individually targeted for blocking. The result of this filtering system is consistent with the Saudi government’s express commitment to censoring morally inappropriate and religiously sensitive material online. More generally, Internet filtering in Saudi Arabia mirrors broader attempts by the state to repress opposition and promote a single religious creed. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;NOTES&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;ol class=&quot;footnotes&quot;&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote1_lw6gr84&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref1_lw6gr84&quot;&gt;1.&lt;/a&gt; U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2005: Saudi Arabia, March 8, 2006, &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61698.htm&quot; title=&quot;http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61698.htm&quot;&gt;http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61698.htm&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote2_jnuzpib&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref2_jnuzpib&quot;&gt;2.&lt;/a&gt; Amnesty International, Annual Report 2006: Saudi Arabia, &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/saudi_arabia/document.do?id=ar&amp;amp;yr=2006&quot; title=&quot;http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/saudi_arabia/document.do?id=ar&amp;amp;yr=2006&quot;&gt;http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/saudi_arabia/document.do?id=ar&amp;amp;yr=20...&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote3_k7jie9i&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref3_k7jie9i&quot;&gt;3.&lt;/a&gt; U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2005: Saudi Arabia, March 8, 2006, &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61698.htm&quot; title=&quot;http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61698.htm&quot;&gt;http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61698.htm&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote4_76khc30&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref4_76khc30&quot;&gt;4.&lt;/a&gt; Reporters Without Borders, Saudi Arabia: Annual Report 2007, &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=20775&amp;amp;Valider=OK&quot; title=&quot;http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=20775&amp;amp;Valider=OK&quot;&gt;http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=20775&amp;amp;Valider=OK&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote5_ry74j2a&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref5_ry74j2a&quot;&gt;5.&lt;/a&gt; Reporters Without Borders, Saudi Arabia: Annual Report 2006, &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=17185&quot; title=&quot;http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=17185&quot;&gt;http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=17185&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote6_3y5bco1&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref6_3y5bco1&quot;&gt;6.&lt;/a&gt; Ibid.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote7_ry24ubc&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref7_ry24ubc&quot;&gt;7.&lt;/a&gt; Internet World Stats, Internet Usage in the Middle East, &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats5.htm#me&quot; title=&quot;http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats5.htm#me&quot;&gt;http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats5.htm#me&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote8_z0kw6w4&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref8_z0kw6w4&quot;&gt;8.&lt;/a&gt; &lt;em&gt;Wireless World Forum&lt;/em&gt;, “Telecom industry sees 3G boom in Saudi Arabia,” &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.w2forum.com/i/Telecom_industry_sees_3G_boom_in_Saudi_Arabia&quot; title=&quot;http://www.w2forum.com/i/Telecom_industry_sees_3G_boom_in_Saudi_Arabia&quot;&gt;http://www.w2forum.com/i/Telecom_industry_sees_3G_boom_in_Saudi_Arabia&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote9_8n3pbyj&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref9_8n3pbyj&quot;&gt;9.&lt;/a&gt; Internet Services Unit, King Abdul Aziz City for Science &amp;amp; Technology, &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.isu.net.sa/&quot; title=&quot;http://www.isu.net.sa/&quot;&gt;http://www.isu.net.sa/&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote10_lokddef&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref10_lokddef&quot;&gt;10.&lt;/a&gt; Ibid.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote11_ft7yhyq&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref11_ft7yhyq&quot;&gt;11.&lt;/a&gt; Ibid.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote12_3zsrz5d&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref12_3zsrz5d&quot;&gt;12.&lt;/a&gt; &lt;em&gt;The Washington Post&lt;/em&gt;, “New Clicks in the Arab World,” November 12, 2006, &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/11/AR2006111100886.html&quot; title=&quot;http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/11/AR2006111100886.html&quot;&gt;http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/11/AR200611...&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote13_tp7r4z9&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref13_tp7r4z9&quot;&gt;13.&lt;/a&gt; Ibid.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote14_6mhh3rk&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref14_6mhh3rk&quot;&gt;14.&lt;/a&gt; Reporters Without Borders, Saudi Arabia: Annual Report 2007, &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=20775&amp;amp;Valider=OK&quot; title=&quot;http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=20775&amp;amp;Valider=OK&quot;&gt;http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=20775&amp;amp;Valider=OK&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote15_7xqbgmz&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref15_7xqbgmz&quot;&gt;15.&lt;/a&gt; Ibid.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote16_oagg11z&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref16_oagg11z&quot;&gt;16.&lt;/a&gt; The Baheyeldin Dynasty, “Saudi Arabia’s ISPs: Internet/Cyber Cafes,” &lt;a href=&quot;http://baheyeldin.com/saisp/0006-cafes.phtml&quot; title=&quot;http://baheyeldin.com/saisp/0006-cafes.phtml&quot;&gt;http://baheyeldin.com/saisp/0006-cafes.phtml&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote17_pt400zr&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref17_pt400zr&quot;&gt;17.&lt;/a&gt; Human Rights Watch, Saudi Arabia: Human Rights Developments 2001, &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/mideast/saudi.html&quot; title=&quot;http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/mideast/saudi.html&quot;&gt;http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/mideast/saudi.html&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote18_4npz2y7&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref18_4npz2y7&quot;&gt;18.&lt;/a&gt; The OpenNet Initiative, Internet Filtering in Saudi Arabia in 2004, http://www.opennetinitiative.net/studies/saudi/#toc1c.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote19_tfhp4yr&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref19_tfhp4yr&quot;&gt;19.&lt;/a&gt; Internet Services Unit, “Introduction to Content Filtering,” &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.isu.net.sa/saudi-internet/contenet-filtring/filtring.htm&quot; title=&quot;http://www.isu.net.sa/saudi-internet/contenet-filtring/filtring.htm&quot;&gt;http://www.isu.net.sa/saudi-internet/contenet-filtring/filtring.htm&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote20_0bgobnw&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref20_0bgobnw&quot;&gt;20.&lt;/a&gt; Arab News, “Most of Kingdom’s Internet users aim for the forbidden,” October 2,2005, &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.arabnews.com/?page=1&amp;amp;section=0&amp;amp;article=71012&amp;amp;d=2&amp;amp;m=10&amp;amp;y=2005&quot; title=&quot;http://www.arabnews.com/?page=1&amp;amp;section=0&amp;amp;article=71012&amp;amp;d=2&amp;amp;m=10&amp;amp;y=2005&quot;&gt;http://www.arabnews.com/?page=1&amp;amp;section=0&amp;amp;article=71012&amp;amp;d=2&amp;amp;m=10&amp;amp;y=2005&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote21_2dkhxdh&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref21_2dkhxdh&quot;&gt;21.&lt;/a&gt; Council of Ministers Resolution, Saudi Internet Rules, February 12, 2001, &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.al-bab.com/media/docs/saudi.htm&quot; title=&quot;http://www.al-bab.com/media/docs/saudi.htm&quot;&gt;http://www.al-bab.com/media/docs/saudi.htm&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote22_x4zqhff&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref22_x4zqhff&quot;&gt;22.&lt;/a&gt; Ibid.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote23_94cs9j9&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref23_94cs9j9&quot;&gt;23.&lt;/a&gt; Ibid.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote24_28p29xg&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref24_28p29xg&quot;&gt;24.&lt;/a&gt; Arab News, “Shoura approves law to combat e-crimes,” October 10, 2006, &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.arabnews.com/?page=1&amp;amp;section=0&amp;amp;article=87941&amp;amp;d=10&amp;amp;m=10&amp;amp;y=2006&quot; title=&quot;http://www.arabnews.com/?page=1&amp;amp;section=0&amp;amp;article=87941&amp;amp;d=10&amp;amp;m=10&amp;amp;y=2006&quot;&gt;http://www.arabnews.com/?page=1&amp;amp;section=0&amp;amp;article=87941&amp;amp;d=10&amp;amp;m=10&amp;amp;y=2006&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote25_aa33ec0&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref25_aa33ec0&quot;&gt;25.&lt;/a&gt; Council of Ministers Resolution, Saudi Internet Rules, February 12, 2001, &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.al-bab.com/media/docs/saudi.htm&quot; title=&quot;http://www.al-bab.com/media/docs/saudi.htm&quot;&gt;http://www.al-bab.com/media/docs/saudi.htm&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;
</description>
 <category domain="http://opennet.net/regions/mena">Middle East and North Africa (MENA)</category>
 <category domain="http://opennet.net/country/saudi-arabia">Saudi Arabia</category>
 <pubDate>Thu, 10 May 2007 19:01:43 -0400</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>miriam</dc:creator>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">153 at http://opennet.net</guid>
</item>
<item>
 <title>Saudi journalist to Western journalists in Beijing on Internet filtering: “quit your belly aching” </title>
 <link>http://opennet.net/blog/2008/08/saudi-journalist-western-journalists-beijing-internet-filtering-%E2%80%9Cquit-your-belly-aching</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;Saudi journalist Molouk Y. Ba-Isa wrote an interesting &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.arabnews.com/?page=11&amp;amp;section=0&amp;amp;article=112734&amp;amp;d=12&amp;amp;m=8&amp;amp;y=2008&quot;&gt;article&lt;/a&gt; in Saudi Arabia’s principal English daily (Arab News) in which she reminds the Western journalists covering the 2008 Olympics in Beijing that censorship for people like her in countries such as Saudi Arabia is a daily reality where they have to live and function, not just a matter of a limited time inconvenient.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The article raises a couple of interesting issues that are rarely discussed in the Saudi local press.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;First, in addition to blaming Saudi “faceless bureaucrats” for imposing Internet filtering, she also blames the US corporations for exporting filtering technologies, and the US government for allowing the exportation of these technologies, “to be used to halt freedom of expression through the Internet for hundreds of millions of people.” This is probably the first time the Saudi media accuses the US companies of complicity of human rights violations in Saudi Arabia. Usually the blame is put on the faceless bureaucrats and the security apparatus only.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Second, the journalist not only questions the sensibility of censoring foreign publications and filtering the Internet, but is also critical of the government spending &quot;desperately needed resources&quot; on such efforts and, as she put it, on protecting her morality, instead of allocating these resources to more important issues such as education, infrastructure, and health care. This is interesting because usually the Saudi media does not question the state filtering practices. Previous local reports have expressed concerns over overblocking but rarely are they so openly critical of the entire system.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It remains to be seen whether similar voices will continue to be heard in the Saudi local media, and whether the authorities will listen and respond to these concerns.&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
 <comments>http://opennet.net/blog/2008/08/saudi-journalist-western-journalists-beijing-internet-filtering-%E2%80%9Cquit-your-belly-aching#comments</comments>
 <category domain="http://opennet.net/topics/human-rights">Human rights</category>
 <category domain="http://opennet.net/regions/mena">Middle East and North Africa (MENA)</category>
 <category domain="http://opennet.net/filtering-types/political-filtering">Political filtering</category>
 <category domain="http://opennet.net/country/saudi-arabia">Saudi Arabia</category>
 <category domain="http://opennet.net/filtering-types/social-filtering">Social filtering</category>
 <pubDate>Thu, 14 Aug 2008 07:24:27 -0400</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>ONI-MENA</dc:creator>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">920 at http://opennet.net</guid>
</item>
<item>
 <title>In the News: Hints of Net Liberalization in Certain Spaces, Increased Clamps in Others</title>
 <link>http://opennet.net/blog/2005/11/in-news-hints-net-liberalization-certain-spaces-increased-clamps-others</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;On top of all the excitement at WSIS, there have been some recent articles examining freedom of information on the Net in the Arab world and beyond. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The UAE &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle.asp?xfile=data/business/2005/September/business_September653.xml&amp;amp;section=business&amp;amp;col&quot;&gt;has recently legalized VOIP&lt;/a&gt;, the technology that enables Internet telephony. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.arabnews.com&quot;&gt;Arab News&lt;/a&gt;, the Saudi Arabian English daily, has attempted to highlight the benefits of cultural expression on the Internet. The newspaper recently &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.arabnews.com/?page=1&amp;amp;section=0&amp;amp;article=71832&amp;amp;d=17&amp;amp;m=10&amp;amp;y=2005&amp;amp;pix=kingdom.jpg&amp;amp;category=Kingdom&quot;&gt;published an article&lt;/a&gt; on &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.jsad.net&quot;&gt;Jasad Al-Thaqafa &lt;/a&gt; (note: in Arabic), the Saudi website that serves as a cultural forum for such areas as photography, art, poetry, fiction, and journalism. While the expression of ideas on the site is not unfettered (forum supervisors monitor topics for appropriateness and may even ban users in extreme cases), such an outlet may serve as significant to many who feel constrained by local media. Interestingly, a collection of short stories from the website, entitled &quot;The Spinning Wheel&quot; will be published and sold in local Saudi Arabian bookstores. The original volume was slated to contain 34 stories--but half were rejected due to censorship and will not be published domestically. As a result, while the site is still subject to the widescale filtering that occurs in Saudi Arabia, citizens may very well have greater access to cultural information on the net than in traditional printed media.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Such access may not come without recourse. A &lt;a href=&quot;http://mensnewsdaily.com/blog/2005/10/freedom-of-blogs.htm&quot;&gt;Voice of America story&lt;/a&gt; reports that certain countries are seeking to quiet &quot;outspoken bloggers&quot; and curb political dissent.&lt;br /&gt;
While Saudi Arabia has only recently allowed access to some popular blogging sites, it continues to routinely block over 400,000 sites, undoubtedly including blogs. Providing access to such tools might be a step in the right direction, but the security implications for bloggers are far from clear. According to the &lt;a href=&quot;http://committeetoprotectbloggers.civiblog.org/&quot;&gt;Committee to Protect Bloggers&lt;/a&gt;, Iran has arrested over 20 bloggers for publicly criticizing the regime during the past year alone. The implications for not blogging anonymously in regimes that have such laws can be huge--advocates encourage bloggers to do so by using anonymous email addresses, secure proxies, and not disclosing any personal information in the process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Another recent report indicates that most Net users in Saudi Arabia are prevented from visiting sites they seek to view. Of the estimated 2.2 million users in the country, &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.arabnews.com/?page=1&amp;amp;section=0&amp;amp;article=71012&amp;amp;d=2&amp;amp;m=10&amp;amp;y=2005&quot;&gt;92.5% attempt gain access to blocked websites&lt;/a&gt;. With so many people trying to access filtered content, societal norms may not very well be in line with those of the authorities making these determinations.&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
 <comments>http://opennet.net/blog/2005/11/in-news-hints-net-liberalization-certain-spaces-increased-clamps-others#comments</comments>
 <category domain="http://opennet.net/country/iran">Iran</category>
 <category domain="http://opennet.net/regions/mena">Middle East and North Africa (MENA)</category>
 <category domain="http://opennet.net/country/saudi-arabia">Saudi Arabia</category>
 <category domain="http://opennet.net/country/uae">United Arab Emirates</category>
 <pubDate>Tue, 15 Nov 2005 19:37:08 -0500</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>nart</dc:creator>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">488 at http://opennet.net</guid>
</item>
<item>
 <title>The Market for Unfiltered Internet Access</title>
 <link>http://opennet.net/blog/2005/03/the-market-unfiltered-internet-access</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=2787&quot;&gt;Foreign Policy writes about the market for access to blocked Web sites&lt;/a&gt; in states that filter the Internet. The piece relies on &lt;a href=&quot;/studies/saudi/&quot;&gt;ONI&#039;s Saudi Arabia research&lt;/a&gt; and quotes &lt;a href=&quot;http://blogs.citizenlab.org/deibert/&quot;&gt;principal investigator Ron Deibert&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
 <comments>http://opennet.net/blog/2005/03/the-market-unfiltered-internet-access#comments</comments>
 <category domain="http://opennet.net/country/saudi-arabia">Saudi Arabia</category>
 <pubDate>Tue, 22 Mar 2005 10:08:29 -0500</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>nart</dc:creator>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">444 at http://opennet.net</guid>
</item>
<item>
 <title>Internet Filtering in Saudi Arabia in 2004</title>
 <link>http://opennet.net/blog/2004/11/internet-filtering-saudi-arabia-2004</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;The OpenNet Initiative has just released a new study documenting Internet filtering in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. ONI researchers tested over 60,000 Web addresses during a three-year period and found that the most aggressive censorship focused on pornography (98% of sites tested blocked), drugs (86%), and gambling (93%). The study also explains how filtering occurs: the Saudi system uses a combination of commercial software from the United States (Secure Computing&#039;SmartFilter) and input from expert local staff and Saudi citizens to control the availability of Web sites inside the Kindgom. For the first time, ONI&#039;s tests differentiate SmartFilter&#039;s blocking from blocking put in place specifically by Saudi Arabia&#039;s Internet Services Unit personnel. As the ONI&#039;s research reveals, even though the system is relatively transparent and evident to users, errors and over-blocking still occur. &lt;a href=&quot;/studies/saudi/&quot;&gt;Click Here&lt;/a&gt; for the full report.&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
 <comments>http://opennet.net/blog/2004/11/internet-filtering-saudi-arabia-2004#comments</comments>
 <category domain="http://opennet.net/regions/mena">Middle East and North Africa (MENA)</category>
 <category domain="http://opennet.net/topics/publications">Publications</category>
 <category domain="http://opennet.net/country/saudi-arabia">Saudi Arabia</category>
 <pubDate>Wed, 17 Nov 2004 15:18:43 -0500</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>nart</dc:creator>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">473 at http://opennet.net</guid>
</item>
<item>
 <title>Internet Filtering in Saudi Arabia in 2004</title>
 <link>http://opennet.net/studies/saudi</link>
 <description>&lt;h3&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#toc1&quot;&gt;1. Introduction and Executive Summary&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#toc1a&quot;&gt;A. Summary&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;#toc1b&quot;&gt;B. Our Research&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;#toc1c&quot;&gt;C. Blocking Patterns In Saudi Arabia&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;#toc1d&quot;&gt;D. Overblocking&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;#toc1e&quot;&gt;E. Conclusion&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#toc2&quot;&gt;2. Overview of the Internet and Filtering in Saudi Arabia&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#toc2a&quot;&gt;A. History&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;#toc2b&quot;&gt;B. Control Infrastructure&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;#toc2c&quot;&gt;C. Banned Content&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;#toc2d&quot;&gt;D. Transparency in and Support for Filtering Internet Content&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#toc3&quot;&gt;3. Research Goals and Methodology&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#toc3a&quot;&gt;A. Goals&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;#toc3b&quot;&gt;B. Methodology&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;#toc3c&quot;&gt;C. Caveats&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#toc4&quot;&gt;4. Data and Analysis&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#toc4a&quot;&gt;A. Data on General Content Availability in Saudi Arabia&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;#toc4b&quot;&gt;B. Analysis of Saudi Content Filtering&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;#toc4c&quot;&gt;C. Analysis of Filtering Methods&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;#toc4d&quot;&gt;D. Analysis of Filtering Choices&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#toc5&quot;&gt;5. Conclusion&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;toc1&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;1. Introduction and Executive Summary&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;toc1a&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;A. Summary&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia controls the information its citizens can readily access on the World Wide Web through a sophisticated filtering system that draws upon commercial software from the United States (&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.securecomputing.com/index.cfm?skey=85&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;Secure Computing&#039;s SmartFilter&lt;/a&gt;) for technical implementation and site blocking suggestions, expert local staff for operations and additional site identification, and Saudi citizen input to suggest over- or under-blocking according to stated filtering criteria.  &lt;a href=&quot;http://opennet.net/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;The OpenNet Initiative&lt;/a&gt; (ONI) has tested filtering in Saudi Arabia over a three-year period.  We found that the Kingdom&#039;s filtering focuses on a few types of content: pornography (98% of these sites tested blocked in our research), drugs (86%), gambling (93%), religious conversion, and sites with tools to circumvent filters (41%).  In contrast, Saudi Arabia shows less interest in sites on gay and lesbian issues (11%), politics (3%), Israel (2%), religion (less than 1%), and alcohol (only 1 site).  Unlike filtering in states such as &lt;a href=&quot;http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/china/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;China&lt;/a&gt;, the policies, procedures, and philosophy for Saudi Arabia&#039;s filtering system are relatively transparent and documented on the &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.isu.net.sa/saudi-internet/contenet-filtring/filtring-mechanism.htm&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;Web site&lt;/a&gt; of its &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.isu.net.sa/index.htm&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;Internet Services Unit&lt;/a&gt; (ISU).  Users who try to access forbidden sites see a Web page informing them that the site is prohibited.  Despite this openness about filtering, the system inevitably errs, resulting in overblocking of unrelated content. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;toc1b&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;B. Our Research&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We selected roughly 60,000 Web addresses in 2002, 2003, and 2004 to discover what content Saudi Arabia blocks and attempted to access those Web addresses as if using the Internet within Saudi Arabia.  In 2004, we also tested two different lists of Web pages: one list broadly covers sensitive material, and one list focuses on an index of prominent sites in important categories such as politics, religion, and human rights.  Our tests in 2004 also recorded whether a site is apparently blocked because of its presence on SmartFilter&#039;s list or because the ISU itself added the page to the block list.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;toc1c&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;C. Blocking Patterns In Saudi Arabia&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Our research found substantial blocking of provocative attire, Bahai faith, Holocaust, free Web hosting, opposition political groups, and Islamic extremist sites, but the lower filtering rate in this area indicates the ISU does not attempt to prevent access to all such content.  Saudi Arabia passively blocks pages on gay / lesbian / bisexual issues, sexuality, women’s rights, Israel, politics, and the occult - the ISU responds to block requests, but devotes no special attention to this content.  Surprisingly, the Kingdom blocks few sites related to alcohol, most religions (including Judaism), or media.  This pattern demonstrates a filtering regime that is more limited - and more effective - than previously believed. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The most aggressive censorship focused on pornography, drug use, gambling, religious conversion of Muslims, and filtering circumvention tools. Our testing documented cases in which the ISU detected and blocked new pornographic content far faster than Secure Computing updated its own lists for SmartFilter.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In contrast, the low blocking rate of sites on gay and lesbian issues, women&#039;s rights, politics, extremist groups, most religions, alcohol, and Israel suggests that the Saudi filtering regime does not target this content.  Indeed, we observed a slight decrease in blocking of human rights sites from 2002 to 2004.  Saudi Arabia seems to filter these topics only when particular sites are brought to the government&#039;s attention rather than by taking active steps to find this material and to block access to it.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;toc1d&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;D. Overblocking&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Despite the sophistication of its systems, the Kingdom&#039;s filtering regime does block sites that appear to fall outside stated prohibited topics.  We found such sites blocked both because SmartFilter classified them erroneously - for example, categorizing a &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.mcchawaii.org/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;Hawaiian church site&lt;/a&gt; as pornography - and because filtering requires normative judgments to label content - for example, labeling a &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.homa.org/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;women&#039;s human rights site&lt;/a&gt; as nudity because of one image of a naked woman showing the marks of torture.   &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;toc1e&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;E. Conclusion&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This study is part of ONI&#039;s ongoing initiative to improve understanding of international Internet filtering.  Like most filtering regimes, Saudi Arabia&#039;s system blends technology, policy and personnel; and like most states, the Kingdom&#039;s decisions are shaped and limited by the U.S.-based filtering software it employs.   &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;toc2&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;2. Overview of the Internet and Filtering in Saudi Arabia&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;toc2a&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;A. History&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Saudi Arabia only permitted its citizens public access to the Internet once the state felt confident it could control the content users could access.  Strong Internet filtering was a prerequisite for Internet deployment in the Kingdom.  Saudi Arabia established an Internet link for government use in 1994, but delayed wider availability for the next three years while the government debated the benefits, drawbacks, and logistical requirements of public access&lt;a href=&quot;#2&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;.   Although worried about the &quot;availability of pornographic material... [and] anti-government propaganda&quot; and &quot;the potential for proselytization of Saudi Muslims by foreign religions via the Web,&quot;&lt;a href=&quot;#3&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;   the Saudi government ultimately decided to allow public access, provided the country could create a state-wide firewall to &quot;reduce the potential for [citizens] to access inappropriate information.&quot;&lt;a href=&quot;#4&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;   Public access finally debuted in 1999 -- over three years later than in most Persian Gulf states.&lt;a href=&quot;#5&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;5&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;   Saudi Arabia&#039;s Council of Ministers issued a decree in 2001 regulating Internet use that prohibits users from accessing or publishing certain forbidden content.&lt;a href=&quot;#6&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;6&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;   As of the end of 2003, 1.6 million Saudis were counted as Internet users, out of a population of over 21 million.&lt;a href=&quot;#7&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;7&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;toc2b&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;B. Control Infrastructure&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Saudi Arabia has an effective and reasonably transparent Internet filtering regime.  The Kingdom achieves its control over the content users can access by placing proxy servers between the state-owned Internet backbone and servers in the rest of the world.  Requests from Saudi ISP users must travel through these proxies, where they can be filtered and blocked.  The Internet Services Unit (ISU) of the King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology (KACST) maintains the firewall and its content filters.&lt;a href=&quot;#8&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;8&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;    Saudi Arabia is open about filtering Internet content, and provides relatively expansive details about the content it blocks and the methods it employs, although it does not offer a list of blocked Web sites.  The ISU describes its filtering system explicitly on its public Web site: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;KACST maintains a central log and specialized proxy equipment, which processes all page requests from within the country and compares them to a black list of banned sites.  If the requested page is included in the black list then it is dropped, otherwise it is executed, then the request is archived.  These black lists are purchased from commercial companies and renewed on a continuous basis throughout the year. This commercial list is then enhanced with various sites added locally by trained staff.&lt;a href=&quot;#9&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;9&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If a Saudi Internet user tries to access a page blocked by the government, the requested page is &quot;dropped&quot;; instead of showing the page, the user&#039;s computer displays a &quot;block page&quot; stating that &quot;[a]ccess to the requested URL is not allowed!&quot;.  (See Appendix 1 for an example of a block page.)  Previous research by ONI collaborators identified Secure Computing&#039;s SmartFilter software as the commercial filtering technology Saudi Arabia uses as a source of &quot;black lists&quot; and method of blocking access.&lt;a href=&quot;#10&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;10&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;  The Saudi filtering system uses default rules for blocking access - if a specific URL is not listed in the black list, but its parent domain or directory is blocked, the filtering system will block that URL.&lt;a href=&quot;#11&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;11&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;toc2c&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;C. Banned Content&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Saudi Arabia targets specific categories of content for blocking.  Pursuant to the 2001 Council of Ministers decree, the ISU prohibits &quot;pornographic web pages... [and] pages related to drugs, bombs, alcohol, gambling, and pages insulting to the Islamic religion or the Saudi laws and regulations.&quot;&lt;a href=&quot;#12&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;12&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;   The ISU identifies pornography as the &quot;most noteworthy&quot; topic, claiming that 95% of all blocked pages fall within this category.&lt;a href=&quot;#13&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;13&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;   Under the heading &quot;Usefulness of Filtering,&quot; the ISU justifies its blocking efforts by citing the Qur&#039;an&lt;a href=&quot;#14&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;14&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;  and invoking an American law review article correlating restrictions on pornography with reduced rates of murder and rape.&lt;a href=&quot;#15&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;15&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;   However, the justifications do not extend to non-pornographic content; the ISU simply states that &quot;non-pornographic sites are only blocked based upon direct requests from the security bodies within the government.&quot;&lt;a href=&quot;#16&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;16&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;toc2d&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;D. Transparency in and Support for Filtering Internet Content&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While the Saudi government (like most states that filter) does not reveal its list of blocked sites, the Saudi filtering process is openly described.  First, the state expressly and publicly states it limits access to certain Internet materials, and reveals which types of content it tries to block.  Second, the block page a user receives when attempting to access a forbidden site explains that the site is blocked and why it is filtered.  Third, this block page contains links to a form for requesting that the site be unblocked and to a form for suggesting other sites for the government to block.  Thus, Saudi Internet users are invited to participate in the blocking process to a limited degree. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;How effective such user suggestions are is unknown independently, though Saudi officials have offered statistics on such requests to block and unblock Web sites to argue that filtering enjoys broad support.  Earlier this year, the ISU&#039;s director reported the unit receives 200 requests each day to block currently accessible sites, but only a &quot;trickle&quot; of requests to restore access to blocked sites.&lt;a href=&quot;#17&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;17&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;   In 2001, a Saudi official reported 500 block requests and 100 unblock requests daily,&lt;a href=&quot;#18&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;18&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;  with 30% of the block requests and 3% of the unblock requests resulting in the addition or removal of a site from the list.&lt;a href=&quot;#19&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;19&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;   The ISU director presented this ratio of block to unblock requests as demonstrating &quot;wide public support&quot; for filtering.&lt;a href=&quot;#20&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;20&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;   &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Of course, Saudi citizens might feel uncomfortable asking ISU to stop filtering a site.  Users must include an e-mail address to submit such a request, which might dissuade Saudis from requesting that certain sites, especially political ones, be unblocked.  In addition, several of ISU&#039;s studies indicate that the block and unblock request statistics may not accurately reflect public opinion.  A 1999 ISU study found that 45% of users perceived the level of site blocking as &quot;too much,&quot; although 14% sought more stringent restrictions and 41% found the filtering level acceptable: &lt;a href=&quot;#21&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;21&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;   &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;div align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
&lt;table border=&quot;1&quot; cellpadding=&quot;2&quot; cellspacing=&quot;2&quot; width=&quot;250&quot; bordercolor=&quot;#000000&quot;&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;Satisfaction with KACST site blocking&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Too much&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;45%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Reasonable &lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;41%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Not enough&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;14%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Figure 1
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Moreover, 16% of respondents in a 2002 study mentioned government filtering as a common problem they encountered while using the Internet.&lt;a href=&quot;#22&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;22&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;   Saudi citizens also express dissatisfaction with filtering through their spending patterns.  Demand for blocked content has created a new market; a Jedda Arab News report describes individuals &quot;within every computer center in Riyadh&quot; willing to provide access to blocked sites at rates of 100 to 250 Saudi Riyals per site ($26 - $67 US).&lt;a href=&quot;#23&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;23&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;   To complain about overblocking or to pay a computer expert to circumvent filtering, though, a Saudi user must know about desirable content that is blocked - they must have some intuition about the site that they cannot access. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;toc3&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;3. Research Goals and Methodology&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This section describes the goals for our 2004 study of Saudi Arabia&#039;s Internet filtering and how we conducted our research. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;toc3a&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;A. Goals&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This report seeks to build upon the 2002 report &lt;i&gt;Documentation of Internet Filtering in Saudi Arabia&lt;/i&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#24&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;24&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;  by documenting the types of Web sites unavailable to Saudi citizens, the extent of filtering within certain categories, and the changes in filtering observed over a two-year period.  By assessing potential technical and philosophical reasons for filtering particular sites and categories, we hope to gain a preliminary understanding of what content the Saudi government considers to &quot;violate the tenants [sic] of the Islamic religion or societal norms,&quot;&lt;a href=&quot;#25&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;25&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;  and we seek to explore the apparently unintended consequences of large-scale Web filtering.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;toc3b&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;B. Methodology&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The OpenNet Initiative (ONI) has conducted three rounds of testing of Saudi Arabia&#039;s Internet filtering system.&lt;a href=&quot;#26&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;26&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;   The first testing occurred in May 2002 with the permission and cooperation of ISU staff.  We created a list of over 60,000 URLs (Uniform Resource Locators, such as cyber.law.harvard.edu) by targeting the most popular results from queries to the Google and Yahoo! search engines for sensitive content, including such topics as the Israel/Palestine conflict, human rights abuses within Saudi Arabia, the 1991 Iraq war, drugs, terrorism, Judaism, and higher education.  (We refer to this list as the &quot;wide list.&quot;)  We attempted to access Web pages on the wide list from proxy servers located within Saudi Arabia and from a control location in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in the United States.  Since all such requests from within the Kingdom pass through a central array of servers, our proxy server requests were subject to the government&#039;s filtering, allowing us to determine which pages were accessible and which were blocked.   &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In December 2003 and July 2004, we tested pages from the wide list using a similar methodology, but without explicit ISU permission.&lt;a href=&quot;#27&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;27&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;  We considered a page &quot;blocked&quot; in Saudi Arabia when the majority of our attempts to reach it returned a block page.  (See Appendix 1 for an example of a block page.)  We did not consider a page blocked if we received a non-block page response from the Saudi server, but that response differed from the one we received at our control location in Toronto, Canada.&lt;a href=&quot;#28&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;28&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;   &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In our 2004 testing, we captured new data from the block pages returned by the Saudi filtering system that allowed us to determine whether a Web site was blocked due to its classification by the SmartFilter software or due to independent action by ISU staff, who manually add certain sites to the country&#039;s black list.  The block pages included an HTML tag, &quot;ISUTag,&quot; that either had the value &quot;sf&quot; (meaning a block due to a SmartFilter category filtered by the ISU) or &quot;local&quot; (meaning a block due to ISU adding the site to the black list manually).  We analyzed the relationship between the ISUTag value and the SmartFilter categorization for tested sites.  Of the blocked sites where the ISUTag value was &quot;local,&quot; only 7% were classified by SmartFilter in categories the Saudis choose to block.  However, 60% of sites with an ISUTag value of &quot;sf&quot; fell in these categories.  While our analysis does not unequivocally demonstrate that all &quot;sf&quot; blocks result from SmartFilter categorization, it strongly establishes that &quot;local&quot; blocks do not result from the SmartFilter software, but instead derive from independent ISU action.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In each test, we utilized multiple proxy servers in Saudi Arabia to gauge the filtering system&#039;s consistency.&lt;a href=&quot;#29&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;29&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;   The filtering system comprises at least 10 servers, and maintaining identical black lists on every computer can be challenging.  While we found some discrepancies, blocking was generally consistent during our tests: the majority of blocked pages were always blocked, though a small percentage (5 - 10%) were occasionally accessible and occasionally blocked.&lt;a href=&quot;#30&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;30&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In addition to the wide list, we tested several smaller, more targeted lists.  In 2002, we tested an additional 795 pornographic sites.  In 2004, we tested an &quot;index list&quot; designed to provide an overview of a country&#039;s filtering efforts; it included 740 sites divided into 30 categories.  These categories were developed by the ONI researchers rather than using the Open Directory Project (known as &quot;dmoz&quot;) classification system.  (Dmoz constructed a massive taxonomy of Internet content and utilizes volunteer editors to maintain lists of the most useful and content-rich sites within each category.&lt;a href=&quot;#32&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;32&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;)  We also tested 21 Islamist sites compiled by the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) in 2004 to examine whether Saudi Arabia tries to block certain extremist groups. &lt;a href=&quot;#31&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;31&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To identify content-based filtering patterns, we attempted to collect category information for each URL through dmoz.  Categorizing sites on our list helps us isolate topics and content areas that Saudi Arabia focuses on blocking, particularly since the SmartFilter software the ISU employs permits blocking based on its categorization of Web sites.  For example, SmartFilter permits a state that uses the software to block all sites that it categorizes as &quot;nudity.&quot;  For our study, we accepted the dmoz categorizations as accurate depictions of a particular Web site&#039;s content.  We compared the dmoz categorizations to the categorizations used by the SmartFilter software, which are available from a Secure Computing&#039;s Web site to allow one to check a page&#039;s current categorization in SmartFilter.  &lt;a href=&quot;#33&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;33&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;toc3c&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;C. Caveats&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Testing Internet filtering is a &quot;black box&quot; enterprise.  First, one cannot describe a filtering regime exactly since states do not reveal the black lists used.  This makes it impossible to discover a list&#039;s precise content, particularly since lists are typically frequently adjusted.&lt;a href=&quot;#34&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;34&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;   Thus, results inevitably reflect the researcher&#039;s choice of Web sites to test and the time of testing.   &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Second, our lists had certain limitations.  The majority of sites we tested were written in English, and certain subject areas had a relatively small number of sites tested.  Categories with small numbers of sites include alcohol, gambling, and women&#039;s rights issues.  This is mitigated by the fact that blocked sites represented on average fewer domains that the full list.  Since dmoz does not categorize every site within a domain, testing multiple URLs results in a number being uncategorized.   &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Third, testing filtering with proxy servers has unavoidable limitations.  We had no information about the proxy servers&#039; configuration.  For example, particular proxies may run additional filtering software or may not be filtered at all (such as proxies serving government entities).  Testing each URL on multiple proxies is intended to mitigate these concerns.  In addition, the centralized nature of the Saudi Internet filtering system (along with our repeated rounds of testing on multiple proxies) ensures that our results reflect not only the behavior that Saudi citizens have reported, but the environment that most Saudi users experience.&lt;a href=&quot;#35&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;35&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Third, the dmoz categories contain inherent limits.  We downloaded category data from dmoz in August 2004, so certain pages&#039; content may have changed sufficiently since then to affect their categorization.  Dmoz listings contained only 39% of pages we tested, creating a lower block percentage for dmoz-listed sites than for sites overall.  This low inclusion rate likely reflects lesser dmoz interest in classifying certain areas of interest to Saudi Arabia, such as pornography. &lt;a href=&quot;#36&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;36&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fourth, we base SmartFilter categorizations on tests run using the SmartFilterWhere tool&lt;a href=&quot;#37&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;37&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;  in early July 2004 and repeated in late August 2004.  The SmartFilterWhere tool lets users check SmartFilter&#039;s current categorization of a URL in three versions (version 4, version 3.x Standard, and version 3.x Premium) of the software.  The tool does not allow checking a URL&#039;s past categorization; thus, it can be difficult to determine whether a URL&#039;s classification has changed over time.  SmartFilter categories change frequently; of the roughly 26,000 URLs we checked on both dates, 10% changed between dates through having at least one category added to or removed from the URL.  Secure Computing, SmartFilter&#039;s developer, claims to update its list daily.&lt;a href=&quot;#38&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;38&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;    SmartFilter uses a &quot;control list&quot; that includes URLs and categories for as many sites as Secure Computing can analyze.  SmartFilter customers create their black lists by choosing which categories, and sites, to block.  SmartFilter makes updates to the control list available to customers.  Since the ISU loads updates to the control list onto the Saudi servers regularly, we cannot determine how closely the SmartFilterWhere list and categorizations match those used by the Saudi filtering system.  However, we assume that SmartFilter locates and corrects erroneously categorized pages as part of updating the control list;&lt;a href=&quot;#39&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;39&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;  this causes miscategorized Web pages to be underrepresented since our testing detects only categorization errors that have yet to be corrected.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While we describe the inherent limits to our methodology to allow readers to evaluate our results, we conclude that these issues have no important effect on our outcomes or analysis. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;toc4&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;4. Data and Analysis&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We present the data from our testing below.  Our analysis first examines the types of content blocked by the Saudi filters, first by category and then by area of particular interest to the ISU.  The second stage of our analysis seeks, where possible, to address why particular subject matter was filtered.   &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;toc4a&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;A.  Data on General Content Availability in Saudi Arabia&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Saudi Arabia blocks a small fraction of Internet sites overall, but prevents access to most pornographic and gambling sites, the majority of sex sites (non-pornographic), many sites related to converting Muslims to other religions, and a significant fraction of anonymizer and encryption sites.  Somewhat surprisingly, our testing did not find major blocking of sites related to alcohol, Israel, Judaism (no sites blocked), religion (non-conversion), or women’s issues.   &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The first chart shows the total number of pages tested, and the corresponding number of pages blocked, each year.  Only one-third of blocked sites were filtered in each year of our testing.  However, our research found that changes in filtering were concentrated in a few categories - content categories with the greatest number of added blocked sites also had the greatest number of unblocked sites.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;div align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
&lt;table border=&quot;1&quot; cellpadding=&quot;2&quot; cellspacing=&quot;2&quot; width=&quot;450&quot; bordercolor=&quot;#000000&quot;&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Test Date&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Sites Tested&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Blocks&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Percent of Sites Blocked&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;May 2002&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;63,689&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1,376&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2.2%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;December 2003&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;43,589&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;844&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1.9%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;July 2004&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;56,631&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1,262&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2.2%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Figure 2
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Next, we display all dmoz top-level categories, the total number of sites that we tested within each category, and the percentage of those sites blocked during each of the three tests. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;div align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
&lt;img src=&quot;/sites/opennet.net/files/SaudiStudy_fig3.gif&quot; border-&quot;0&quot; alt=&quot;Figure 3&quot;&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Figure 3
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Figure 4 contains the results of the 2004 &quot;index list&quot; test, including the number of sites in each category and the percentage blocked for that category.  In the index list, categories were defined by the ONI researchers, not by the dmoz classification system. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;div align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
&lt;img src=&quot;/sites/opennet.net/files/SaudiStudy_fig4.gif&quot; border-&quot;0&quot; alt=&quot;Figure 3&quot;&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Figure 4
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;toc4b&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;B. Analysis of Saudi Content Filtering&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Saudi Arabia concentrates its filtering efforts on a few distinct types of content, particularly that related to pornography, drugs, gambling, religious conversion, and open proxy servers and anonymizer tools.  In these areas, the state&#039;s blocking is quite successful, though it does unintentionally block some unrelated material.  Sites outside these proscribed categories are generally available.  Thus, filtering by Saudi Arabia is relatively targeted and effective, and while overblocking is a problem, content not related to these sensitive categories is broadly available. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;1. Pornography and Sexual Content&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;Saudi Arabia successfully blocks most sexually explicit material from its Internet users.  Saudi filters are somewhat able to distinguish between pornography and sexually-related content, as shown by the difference in blocking rates between the &quot;adult&quot; and &quot;society/sexuality&quot; categories.  Sites selling swimwear are filtered to a surprisingly high degree.&lt;a href=&quot;#40&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;40&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;  &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;div align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
&lt;table border=&quot;1&quot; cellpadding=&quot;2&quot; cellspacing=&quot;2&quot; width=&quot;450&quot; bordercolor=&quot;#000000&quot;&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td align=&quot;right&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td align=&quot;right&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td align=&quot;right&quot; colspan=&quot;3&quot;&gt;Percent of Sites Blocked&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Category&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Total Sites&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2002&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2003&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2004&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;
Berkman 2002 Pornography List&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;795&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;86%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;--&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;--&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;ONI Index List - Pornography&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;54&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;--&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;--&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;98%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Top/Adult&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;41&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;73%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;79%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;88%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Top/Society/Sexuality&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;27&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;50%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;35%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;50%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Top/../Shopping/../Swimwear&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;21&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;62%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;82%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;67%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Figure 5&lt;a href=&quot;#41&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;41&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;2. Drugs&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;Saudi Arabia filters the majority of Web sites positively portraying recreational drug use, especially those discussing marijuana.  The ISU effectively distinguishes between these sites and those focused on substance abuse, as demonstrated by the sharp disparity in block rates between these categories. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;div align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
&lt;table border=&quot;1&quot; cellpadding=&quot;2&quot; cellspacing=&quot;2&quot; width=&quot;450&quot; bordercolor=&quot;#000000&quot;&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td align=&quot;right&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td align=&quot;right&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td align=&quot;right&quot; colspan=&quot;3&quot;&gt;Percent of Sites Blocked&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Category&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Total Sites&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2002&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2003&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2004&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Drugs&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;66&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;45%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;47%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;52%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Drugs/Illegal&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;23&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;61%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;57%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;65%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Marijuana&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;21&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;57%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;62%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;62%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Cannabis&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;14&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;79%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;69%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;93%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Top/Health/../Substance Abuse&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;43&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;5%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Index List - Drugs&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;28&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;--&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;--&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;86%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Figure 6
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;3. Gambling&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;The ISU filters nearly all well-known gambling sites.  In the 2004 index list test, we found 25 of 27 (93%) such sites blocked.  Earlier tests, and the 2004 wide list test, did not include gambling sites. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;4. Proxies and Anonymizers&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;Saudi Arabia generally blocks open proxy servers and anonymizer sites to prevent users from bypassing its filtering system.  These Web sites allow users to circumvent filtering regimes by connecting to an intermediary, which requests the blocked site and passes the resulting page to the user.  The government firewall only sees the user connect to the intermediary, but does not see the intermediary&#039;s request to retrieve the blocked page;&lt;a href=&quot;#42&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;42&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;  thus, users can successfully evade filtering.  To close this loophole, filtering countries generally add proxy and anonymizer sites to their black lists, and Saudi Arabia conforms to this pattern.  Finding and blocking open proxy servers is a labor-intensive task since these servers change domain names and IP addresses frequently to evade such filtering.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;div align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
&lt;table border=&quot;1&quot; cellpadding=&quot;2&quot; cellspacing=&quot;2&quot; width=&quot;450&quot; bordercolor=&quot;#000000&quot;&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td align=&quot;right&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td align=&quot;right&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td align=&quot;right&quot; colspan=&quot;3&quot;&gt;Percent of Sites Blocked&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Category&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Total Sites&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2002&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2003&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2004&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Top/.. /Internet/Proxying and Filtering&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;11&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;27%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;43%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;27%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Index List - Anonymizers/Encryption&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;17&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;--&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;--&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;41%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Figure 7
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;5. Alcohol&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;The ISU does not filter sites related to alcohol.  In the 2004 index list test, we found only 1 of 21 (5%) alcohol sites blocked.  The wide list testing, and earlier tests, did not include alcohol-related sites.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;6. Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;Saudi Arabia does not focus on blocking gay, lesbian, and bisexual sites.  Our research indicates that while the Saudi filtering system blocks significantly more sites in this category than in most other categories tested, the overall percentage of gay, lesbian, and bisexual sites blocked is quite low.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;div align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
&lt;table border=&quot;1&quot; cellpadding=&quot;2&quot; cellspacing=&quot;2&quot; width=&quot;450&quot; bordercolor=&quot;#000000&quot;&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td align=&quot;right&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td align=&quot;right&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td align=&quot;right&quot; colspan=&quot;3&quot;&gt;Percent of Sites Blocked&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Category&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Total Sites&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2002&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2003&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2004&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;132&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;8%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;11%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;11%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Index List - Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;30&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;--&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;--&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;10%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Figure 8
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;7. Women&#039;s Rights/Feminism/Women in Religion&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;Saudi Arabia filters sites on women&#039;s rights and feminism only to a limited degree.  Our wide list contained only a few sites in these categories.  When we combine the wide list with the index list, we find that Saudi Arabia blocks such pages occasionally, but not comprehensively.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;div align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
&lt;table border=&quot;1&quot; cellpadding=&quot;2&quot; cellspacing=&quot;2&quot; width=&quot;450&quot; bordercolor=&quot;#000000&quot;&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td align=&quot;right&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td align=&quot;right&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td align=&quot;right&quot; colspan=&quot;3&quot;&gt;Percent of Sites Blocked&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Category&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Total Sites&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2002&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2003&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2004&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Top/Society/../Women&#039;s Rights &lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;4&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;25%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Top/../Religion and Spirituality/../Women&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;84&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;4%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Top/Middle East/../Women&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;50%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Top/Society and Culture/Women&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;5&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;20%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Top/../Women in Islam&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;6&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;20%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Index List - Feminism&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;29&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;--&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;--&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Figure 9
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;The 2002 ONI testing also found some blocking of women&#039;s sites, including two categorized as women&#039;s health, one classified as female sexuality, and one categorized as related to women as a cultural group.&lt;a href=&quot;#43&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;43&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;   Of the four sites blocked in 2002, three (women.eb.com, ivillage.com, and skirtmag.com) were not blocked in our testing.  The fourth, teenwire.com, remains blocked, probably because it is categorized by SmartFilter as &quot;mature&quot; and containing &quot;sexual materials.&quot;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;8. Religion&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;Religious sites are rarely blocked in Saudi Arabia, based on our extensive testing of this category.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;div align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
&lt;table border=&quot;1&quot; cellpadding=&quot;2&quot; cellspacing=&quot;2&quot; width=&quot;450&quot; bordercolor=&quot;#000000&quot;&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td align=&quot;right&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td align=&quot;right&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td align=&quot;right&quot; colspan=&quot;3&quot;&gt;Percent of Sites Blocked&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Category&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Total Sites&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2002&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2003&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2004&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Religion
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;8.850&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1.0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0.7%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0.7%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Bahai&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;50&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;10%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;11%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;12%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Apologetics&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;49&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;5%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;6%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Islam   &lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;262&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;5%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;7%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;5%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Scientology&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;91&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Buddhism &lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;341&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Methodist&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;302&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Hinduism &lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;173&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Judaism&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;525&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Presbyterian&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;190&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Christianity&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;5,264&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Episcopal &lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;233&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Catholicism&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;973&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Pentecostalism&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;122&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Index List - Religion (combined)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;57&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;--&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;--&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Figure 10
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;a. Apologetics&lt;a href=&quot;#44&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;44&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;The pages Saudi Arabia blocks in this area were categorized as &quot;Examining Other Beliefs,&quot; primarily Islam.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;b. Islam&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;Our testing found the majority of blocked pages in this category involved either views opposed to Islam (especially Christian views) or non-Sunni Islamic sects (including Shia and Sufism).&lt;a href=&quot;#45&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;45&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;c. Bahai&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;Saudi Arabia blocks a significant minority of Bahai sites.  Our research found a consistent, and growing, level of filtering in this category.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;d. Occult&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;The ISU blocks a small, but increasing, number of sites in this category.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;div align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
&lt;table border=&quot;1&quot; cellpadding=&quot;2&quot; cellspacing=&quot;2&quot; width=&quot;450&quot; bordercolor=&quot;#000000&quot;&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td align=&quot;right&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td align=&quot;right&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td align=&quot;right&quot; colspan=&quot;3&quot;&gt;Percent of Sites Blocked&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Category&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Total Sites&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2002&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2003&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2004&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Pagan&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;130&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Occult&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;92&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;3%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Horoscopes&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;36&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;3%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Astrology&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;193&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Figure 11
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;9. Judaism&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;Saudi Arabia filters no sites related to the Jewish religion, and very few sites with Jewish or Hebrew content.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;div align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
&lt;table border=&quot;1&quot; cellpadding=&quot;2&quot; cellspacing=&quot;2&quot; width=&quot;450&quot; bordercolor=&quot;#000000&quot;&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td align=&quot;right&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td align=&quot;right&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td align=&quot;right&quot; colspan=&quot;3&quot;&gt;Percent of Sites Blocked&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Category&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Total Sites&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2002&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2003&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2004&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Judaism&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;525&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Jewish&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;108&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Hebrew&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;61&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;3%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;4%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;3%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Figure 12
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;The country filters a significant fraction of sites related to the Holocaust against Jews during World War II, though this occurs primarily because SmartFilter categorizes many of these sites as having violent content.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;div align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
&lt;table border=&quot;1&quot; cellpadding=&quot;2&quot; cellspacing=&quot;2&quot; width=&quot;450&quot; bordercolor=&quot;#000000&quot;&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td align=&quot;right&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td align=&quot;right&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td align=&quot;right&quot; colspan=&quot;3&quot;&gt;Percent of Sites Blocked&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Category&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Total Sites&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2002&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2003&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2004&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Holocaust&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;36&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;6%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;11%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Figure 13
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;10. Media&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;Saudi Arabia blocks small amounts of media-related content, concentrating on &quot;zines&quot; (including &quot;e-zines&quot;).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;div align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
&lt;table border=&quot;1&quot; cellpadding=&quot;2&quot; cellspacing=&quot;2&quot; width=&quot;450&quot; bordercolor=&quot;#000000&quot;&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td align=&quot;right&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td align=&quot;right&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td align=&quot;right&quot; colspan=&quot;3&quot;&gt;Percent of Sites Blocked&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Category&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Total Sites&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2002&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2003&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2004&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;News&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2476&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Media&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2091&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Newspapers &lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1316&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Zines &lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;284&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;5%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;5%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;6%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Index List - Major News Outlets&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;35&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;--&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;--&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Figure 14
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;11. Politics&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;Our testing indicates that Saudi Arabia blocks several sites opposing the current government along with a minority of sites discussing the state of Israel, or advocating violence against Israel and the West, and a small amount of material from Amnesty International and Amnesty USA (Figures 15 and 16).
&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;div align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
&lt;table border=&quot;1&quot; cellpadding=&quot;2&quot; cellspacing=&quot;2&quot; width=&quot;450&quot; bordercolor=&quot;#000000&quot;&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td align=&quot;right&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td align=&quot;right&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td align=&quot;right&quot; colspan=&quot;3&quot;&gt;Percent of Sites Blocked&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Category&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Total Sites&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2002&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2003&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2004&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Issues.../Israel Palestine&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;66&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;5%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Issues.../Terrorism&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;24&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;8%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;10%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;8%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;MEMRI list of Islamist websites&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;21&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;--&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;--&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;29%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Israel&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;332&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Figure 15&lt;a href=&quot;#46&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;46&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
&lt;table border=&quot;1&quot; cellpadding=&quot;3&quot; cellspacing=&quot;2&quot; width=&quot;650&quot; bordercolor=&quot;#000000&quot;&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td align=&quot;right&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td align=&quot;right&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td align=&quot;center&quot; colspan=&quot;3&quot;&gt;Blocked?&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;URL&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Description&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2002&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2003&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2004&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.almjlah.com/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;www.almjlah.com/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Pro-Al-Qa&#039;ida website*&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Yes&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.hostinganime.com/neda4/index.htm&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;www.hostinganime.com/neda4/index.htm&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Pro-Al-Qa&#039;ida website*&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Yes&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.hostinganime.com/sout19/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;www.hostinganime.com/sout19/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Pro-Al-Qa&#039;ida website. Publishes Al-Qa&#039;ida&#039;s &lt;i&gt;Al-Battar Training Camp&lt;/i&gt; magazine.*&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Yes&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.manartv.com/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;www.manartv.com/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Website of Hizbullah TV station Al-Manar*&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Yes&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.neda2-friend.co.uk/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;www.neda2-friend.co.uk/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Pro-Al-Qa&#039;ida website*&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Yes&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.sarayaalquds.com/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;www.sarayaalquds.com/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Web site of Al-Quds Brigades, military wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad*&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Yes&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.abrarway.com/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;www.abrarway.com/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;News Web site of Palestinian Islamic Jihad*&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://alsaha.com/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;alsaha.com/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Message forum used by Al-Qa&#039;ida supporters*&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.alsakifah.org/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;www.alsakifah.org/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Message forums used by Al-Qa&#039;ida supporters*&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://ansar-alsonnah.8k.com/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;ansar-alsonnah.8k.com/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Web site of the Army of Ansar Al-Sunnah (known supporters of Al-Qa&#039;ida)*&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.chechan.org/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;http://www.chechan.org/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Web site of the Chechen Information Center*&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.intiqad.com/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;www.intiqad.com/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Pro-Hizbullah weekly magazine*&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.moqawama.org/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;www.moqawama.org/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Pro-Hizbullah website*&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nasrollah.org/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;www.nasrollah.org/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Web site of Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah*&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.qal3ati.org/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;www.qal3ati.org/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Message forums used by Al-Qa&#039;ida supporters*&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.rabdullah.com/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;www.rabdullah.com/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Web site of Palestinian Islamic Jihad Secretary General Dr. Abdallah Ramadhan Shalah*&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Web site of Hizb al-Tahrir*&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.shareeah.org/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;www.shareeah.org/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Web site of Sheikh Abu Hamza and supporters of Shareeah*&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.al-fateh.net/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;www.al-fateh.net/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Hamas children&#039;s magazine*&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.palestine-info.info/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;www.palestine-info.info/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Pro-Hamas website*&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.qudsway.com/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;www.qudsway.com/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Pro-Palestinian Islamic Jihad Web site*&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.saudiinstitute.org&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;www.saudiinstitute.org&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Democratic opposition forum directed by Saudi dissident**&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Yes&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Yes&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.miraserve.com&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;www.miraserve.com&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;London-based Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia - &quot;very critical of the Saudi regime&quot;***&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Yes&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Yes&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Yes&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.hizbollah.org&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;www.hizbollah.org&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Hizabollah central press office&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Yes&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;4&quot;&gt;&lt;i&gt;Note - no content since July 2004, but content available in February 2004&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.wilayah.org&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;www.wilayah.org&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Office of Iran&#039;s Grand Spiritual Leader Ayatollah Khamenei&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.moqawama.org &quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;www.moqawama.org &lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Islamic Resistance Support Association&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.ummah.org.uk&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;www.ummah.org.uk&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;The Muslim Directory Online (12 pages tested)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1 page&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;no test&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;4&quot;&gt;&lt;i&gt;Note - the one page blocked in 2002 was: &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.ummah.org.uk/cdlr&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;http://www.ummah.org.uk/cdlr&lt;/a&gt; which previously served as a redirect to cdrl.net, the home page of the Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights in Saudi Arabia&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.amnesty.org&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;www.amnesty.org&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2,500 total pages tested from this domain&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;19 pages&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;4&quot;&gt;&lt;i&gt;Note - all 19 blocked pages were located in the directory &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/saudi&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/saudi&lt;/a&gt;, a report entitled &quot;Saudi Arabia: A Secret State of Suffering&quot;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.amnesty-usa.org&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;www.amnesty-usa.org&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1237 total pages tested from this domain&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2 pages&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1 page&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1 page&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;4&quot;&gt;&lt;i&gt;Note - the blocked pages were:&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.amnesty-usa.org/countries/saudi_arabia&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;http://www.amnesty-usa.org/countries/saudi_arabia&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Yes&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.amnesty-usa.org/countries/saudi_arabia/morenewsandreports.html&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;http://www.amnesty-usa.org/countries/saudi_arabia/morenewsandreports.html&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Yes&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Yes&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Yes&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;5&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;3&quot;&gt;* Boccara, &lt;i&gt;Islamist Websites and Their Hosts Part I: Islamist Terror Organizations&lt;/i&gt;.&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;3&quot;&gt;** Stephen Schwartz, &lt;i&gt;The Islamic Terrorism Club&lt;/i&gt;, The Weekly Standard, Nov. 10, 2003.&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;5&quot;&gt;*** Reporters Without Borders, &lt;i&gt;Internet Under Surveillance 2004: Saudi Arabia&lt;/i&gt;, at http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=107668&amp;amp;Valider=OK.&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Figure 16
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;12. Free Web Hosting&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;Saudi Arabia&#039;s filtering approach to sites that offer free Web hosting has shifted intriguingly over time.  The ISU began by blocking these sites broadly but shifted to more targeted restrictions.  States that filter the Internet often object to free Web hosting -- companies that provide the free space do little to monitor content, and the sites host widely varying content, making it difficult to adopt a single filtering approach for that domain.  Our research uncovered significant changes by Saudi Arabia in the three years of our testing.  The following chart (Figure 16) shows results for several free Web hosting domains, with the number of pages tested and the percentage blocked for each year&#039;s testing, thus indicating the percentage of pages tested that Saudi Arabia blocks within that domain.  Figures in bold indicate that Saudi Arabia blocks the domain&#039;s home page -- for example, Saudi Arabia&#039;s ISU prevents access to the front page of Virgin&#039;s site at http://virgin.net.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;div align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
&lt;table border=&quot;1&quot; cellpadding=&quot;2&quot; cellspacing=&quot;2&quot; width=&quot;450&quot; bordercolor=&quot;#000000&quot;&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td align=&quot;right&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td align=&quot;right&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td align=&quot;right&quot; colspan=&quot;3&quot;&gt;Percent of Sites Blocked&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Site&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Pages Tested&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2002&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2003&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2004&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.mindspring.com&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;www.mindspring.com&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;66&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;92%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://ourworld.compuserve.com&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;ourworld.compuserve.com&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;67&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;90%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;All of &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.virgin.net&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;www.virgin.net&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;13&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;85%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;85%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;All of &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.fortunecity.com&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;www.fortunecity.com&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;40&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;77%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;81%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;All of &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.erols.com&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;www.erols.com&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;37&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;3%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;92%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;89%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.geocities.com&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;www.geocities.com&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1079&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;3%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.angelfire.com&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;www.angelfire.com&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;188&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://members.aol.com&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;members.aol.com&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;404&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;3%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;3%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://members.tripod.com&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;members.tripod.com&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;150&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;3%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Figure 17
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;Our data indicates that the Saudis originally attempted very broad blocking of several, but not all, free hosting domains.  Saudi Arabia removed broad blocking for some sites in 2003 or 2004, shifting to filtering these domains on a page-by-page basis (an approach the ISU has used consistently for Geocities).  This method comports with the ISU&#039;s stated policy of blocking &quot;only the absolute minimum possible number of web pages possible to fulfill its duties.&quot;&lt;a href=&quot;#47&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;47&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;    Thus, while Saudi Arabia filters many free Web hosting sites, the granularity of its blocking has become more precise and targeted with time.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;toc4c&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;C.  Analysis of Filtering Methods&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Sections A and B describe our findings regarding types of content unavailable to Internet users within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  This section analyzes Saudi Arabia blocking of certain content categories.  Our research reveals whether Saudi Arabia blocks a site because of how the filtering software used by the country classified it or because ISU staff specifically added it to the black list.  This data demonstrates content areas where Saudi Arabia invests additional time, effort, and expense to monitor Web sites and to block access to them for the state&#039;s citizens. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The ISU documentation on filtering&lt;a href=&quot;#48&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;48&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;  explains that sites are added to the black list either by commercial filtering companies (such as Secure Computing) or locally-trained Saudi staff.  The commercial list classifies sites by category, and Saudi Arabia chooses which categories to block.  In addition to sites identified by the commercial software, the ISU selects additional sites to filter.  Thus, the Saudi government filters on both an &quot;outsourced&quot; level (through selecting the commercial software&#039;s black list categories) and a &quot;locally adjusted&quot; level (through selecting particular URLs by ISU staff).  While this distinction may be irrelevant to users who cannot access a desired site, it is vital to understanding how Saudi Arabia uses filtering to control the flow of information in the country.  A site can be blocked in Saudi Arabia for one of three reasons: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;1) SmartFilter classified the site as containing content in a category that Saudi Arabia chooses to block (&quot;macro&quot; level blocking);&lt;br /&gt;
2) SmartFilter incorrectly determined the site contains content in a category that Saudi Arabia chooses to block (&quot;overblocking&quot;); or&lt;br /&gt;
3) The ISU decided to filter the site even though SmartFilter did not classify it as containing content in a category that Saudi Arabia chooses to block (&quot;micro&quot; level blocking).
&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The commercial software categories that Saudi Arabia chooses to block (macro-level blocking and overblocking) indicate content topics that the country generally finds objectionable, while blocking by specific ISU-added URL (micro-level blocking) demonstrates specific concern about a given site or page.  Our 2004 testing obtained data from the block pages generated by the Saudi filtering system that indicates whether a site was blocked due to its SmartFilter categorization or due to specific targeting by Saudi officials.&lt;a href=&quot;#49&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;49&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;   &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To explore macro and micro-level blocking, we evaluated 2004 testing data, since this is the only year for which we were able to obtain the necessary block page data and for which we have contemporaneous SmartFilter category data.&lt;a href=&quot;#50&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;50&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;   &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We find that Saudi Arabia filters sites in these SmartFilter categories: gambling, nudity, extreme&lt;a href=&quot;#51&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;51&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt; , sex, pornography, drugs, obscene/extreme, tasteless/gross, and violence. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;1. Outsourced Filtering - Commercial Software Blocks&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;Analyzing the filtering &quot;outsourced&quot; to the SmartFilter software shows what content Saudi Arabia seeks to block categorically - the state finds any site on this topic unacceptable.  The ISU lists seven prohibited categories: pornography, drugs, bombs, alcohol, gambling, anti-government, and anti-Islamic material.  The SmartFilter software the Saudis employ covers such typical filtering targets as the first five topics, but does not include &quot;anti-Saudi government&quot; as one of its categories.  Using commercial filtering software is virtually required to limit access to content effectively as the Internet&#039;s size and architecture necessitate expending enormous resources to discover and classify sites.  For example, a list on the URLBlacklist.com site contains over half a million Internet domains that contain pornographic sites.&lt;a href=&quot;#52&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;52&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;   Thus, Saudi Arabia&#039;s decision to utilize a commercial service to block traditionally-censored categories is unsurprising.  In effect, Saudi Arabia outsources the work required to find and classify sites in these content areas to Secure Computing, the software provider.    &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;a. SmartFilter Categories Blocked&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;The SmartFilter software categorizes Web sites into either 30 or 62 categories (depending on the version of the software used).&lt;a href=&quot;#53&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;53&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;   Filtering entities, such as the ISU, can decide to block or permit access to each category independently.  By reviewing whether pages within various SmartFilter categories were blocked, we created a list of filtered categories in Saudi Arabia -- gambling, nudity, extreme&lt;a href=&quot;#54&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;54&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt; , sex, pornography, drugs, obscene/extreme, tasteless/gross, and violence.&lt;a href=&quot;#55&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;55&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;   Saudi Arabia blocked 92% of the Web pages listed in one or more of these categories.  In contrast, only 1% of the pages not included in one of these categories were blocked.  We conclude these SmartFilter categories constitute the subjects about which Saudi Arabia is most concerned.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;b. Overblocking Through SmartFilter Categorization Errors&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;Saudi Arabia blocks some Web sites unintentionally because SmartFilter categorizes them incorrectly.  We found examples of Web pages classified as pornography by SmartFilter, but not classified as adult by dmoz, that Saudi Arabia blocked.  Categorization errors are inevitable.  Researchers question the accuracy of software classification of Web content.&lt;a href=&quot;#56&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;56&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;   SmartFilter&#039;s own marketing material quotes a study finding &quot;94% of sites accurately blocked&quot;;&lt;a href=&quot;#57&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;57&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;  thus, the software errs at least 6% of the time.  To place this error rate in context, the search engine Google currently searches over 4 billion Web pages;&lt;a href=&quot;#58&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;58&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt; were SmartFilter to categorize all these pages, it would make mistakes for over 240 million pages.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;SmartFilter categorization mistakes can block content in unintended categories.  We compared SmartFilter categorizations with those from dmoz and located pages likely blocked for this reason in Saudi Arabia.  SmartFilter categorizes 77 pages as &quot;Pornography&quot; that dmoz also analyzes; however, only 25 received a dmoz classification of &quot;Adult.&quot;  Of the remaining 52 pages, 50 were blocked in Saudi Arabia.  Dmoz categorized these pages as follows:&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;div align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
&lt;table border=&quot;1&quot; cellpadding=&quot;2&quot; cellspacing=&quot;2&quot; width=&quot;350&quot; bordercolor=&quot;#000000&quot;&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Dmoz Category&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Sites&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2004 Blocks&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Religion&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;19&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;19&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;4&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;3&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Art&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Sexuality&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;3&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;3&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Media&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;4&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;4&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Embroidery&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Figure 18
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;Classification errors by filtering software are inevitable.  However, SmartFilter miscategorization leads Saudi Arabia to block more content than the state intends, preventing Saudi citizens from accessing information they otherwise would be permitted to view.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;c. Qualitative Decisions in Software Filtering&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;Classifying a Web site&#039;s content requires difficult subjective decisions.  By using the SmartFilter software, Saudi Arabia necessarily concedes many of these hard choices about what information its citizens can access to an American software company.  &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;Even &quot;correct&quot; categorization of a site necessarily involves qualitative determinations that demonstrate the difficulties inherent in content filtering; the question for filtering regimes is who should make that decision.  We found 10 sites blocked in Saudi Arabia with SmartFilter designations of &quot;Nudity&quot; that dmoz classified as &quot;Art&quot;.  Some of these sites undoubtedly contained nude photographs or drawings, and the question of whether to censor such content is an old one.  What is new, however, is that the technology used in Saudi Arabia has an American company making such decisions for Saudi citizens.  Though the Saudi government chooses to block a category such as pornography, SmartFilter makes the normative decision to include a site in that category based on its impression of the site&#039;s content.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;Certain categorization issues are intensely complicated.  We found two pages relating to the Holocaust against Jews during World War Two blocked in Saudi Arabia, likely because SmartFilter placed them in its &quot;Violence&quot; category.  Clearly, much educational material on the Holocaust contains descriptions and depictions of violence.  Whether some violent content merits blocking educational Web sites is a difficult decision, and an odd one for a foreign filtering company to make for a country&#039;s citizens.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;Commercial software&#039;s filtering categorization inevitably simplifies a Web site&#039;s content.  This reductionism makes analyzing the meaning of Saudi filtering more difficult.  For example, we found that Saudi Arabia blocks an Iranian women&#039;s rights site, the Dr. Homa Darabi Foundation,&lt;a href=&quot;#59&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;59&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt; probably because SmartFilter classifies it as containing nudity.  (In contrast, dmoz categorizes this site under &quot;Women&#039;s Rights&quot; and &quot;Middle East/Society and Culture/Women&quot;.)  Our researchers reviewed the site and found a picture of a naked woman displaying her injuries from the 50 lashes she received &quot;for being present at a family gathering where men other than her father and brother were present.&quot;&lt;a href=&quot;#60&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;60&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;   After comparing the filtering rates of sites SmartFilter categorizes as &quot;nudity&quot; (high in Saudi Arabia) and those dmoz categorizes under &quot;women&#039;s rights&quot; (low), we conclude that the SmartFilter categorization causes the block.  Technically, the SmartFilter categorization is correct - the page indeed contains an image of a naked woman.  However, this classification reduces the site&#039;s complex content by focusing on a single, non-pornographic picture.  &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;Because Saudi Arabia employs an American company to assist the state&#039;s Web filtering by classifying content, Saudi citizens are denied access to content beyond that which the government intends to prohibit.  Overblocking is inevitable, and probably unwanted by Saudi Arabia.  Theoretically, a Saudi user could submit a request to unblock a Web page through the link on the ISU block page.  However, this user would have to know what content the blocked site offers and reveal his or her name as the requestor.  &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;d. Conclusion&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;Saudi Arabia reveals certain normative judgments about content the state views as undesirable through the SmartFilter categories it chooses to block.  Filtering this material, though, involves subjective decisions that can be difficult and that risk simplifying complex content and unintentionally blocking information.  Furthermore, by using the SmartFilter software, Saudi Arabia allows an American company to make many of these judgments.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;2. Locally Adjusted Filtering - Blocks by ISU&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;In addition to blocking sites through selecting SmartFilter categories, Saudi Arabia selects Internet content to filter on its own.  At this local level, the ISU indicates two reasons why it adds sites to the black list: &quot;direct requests from the security bodies within the government&quot;&lt;a href=&quot;#61&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;61&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;  or requests submitted from a Web form by &quot;concerned citizens.&quot;&lt;a href=&quot;#62&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;62&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;   ISU staff review the URLs requested to be blocked and decide which sites to add to the black list.  Our research finds these locally-blocked sites generally fall into two categories: content in a category Saudi Arabia prohibits using the SmartFilter software, but that SmartFilter has not yet properly classified, and content viewed as &quot;anti-Islam&quot; and &quot;anti-government&quot; that cannot be blocked because SmartFilter does not include such categories.  Since the ISU does not reveal its classifications, we cannot determine precisely how it categorizes a locally-filtered site on the black list.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;3. Conclusion&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;Our data indicate that sites marked as SmartFilter blocks&lt;a href=&quot;#63&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;63&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;  were indeed blocked because of their SmartFilter classification, and that sites marked as local blocks&lt;a href=&quot;#64&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;64&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;  were blocked because the ISU decided independently to prohibit them.  Sites marked as SmartFilter blocks, but not yet classified by the software, are filtered either because their SmartFilter categorization differs from that available from the public SmartFilterWhere tool or because the ISU blocks them but the block page does not mark them as &quot;local&quot;.  Based on these conclusions, we now sketch the contours of Internet filtering in Saudi Arabia.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;toc4d&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;D. Analysis of Filtering Choices&lt;br /&gt;
This section reviews and analyzes various categories of blocked content.  The ISU Web site lists the types of content targeted for filtering: pornography, drugs, bombs, alcohol, gambling, and pages &quot;insulting to the Islamic religion or the Saudi laws and regulations.&quot;&lt;a href=&quot;#65&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;65&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;   We explore our blocking data to reveal that Saudi Arabia actually concentrates its filtering efforts on Web sites related to pornography, drug use, gambling, open proxies and encryption tools, and religious conversion.  Our research found substantial blocking of provocative attire, Bahai faith, Holocaust, free Web hosting, opposition political group, and Islamic extremist sites, but the lower filtering rate in this area indicates the ISU does not attempt to prevent access to all such content.  Saudi Arabia passively blocks pages on gay / lesbian / bisexual issues, sexuality, women&#039;s rights, Israel, politics, and the occult - the ISU responds to block requests, but devotes no special attention to this content.  Surprisingly, the Kingdom blocks few sites related to alcohol, most religions (including Judaism), or media. This pattern demonstrates a filtering regime that is more limited - and more effective - than previously believed. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;1. Material Actively and Pervasively Blocked&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;Saudi Arabia focuses its filtering efforts on blocking access to material in these categories and topic areas.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;a. Pornography &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;Our research indicates the Saudi government is extremely dedicated to filtering pornographic Web pages - in fact, the ISU is often faster to block porn than the SmartFilter software updates are.  This commitment strengthened over the years of our testing; block rates for pornographic sites increased from 86% of URLs tested in 2002 to 98% in 2004.  The intensity of the Saudi effort reveals itself in the speed at which ISU identifies and blocks new pornographic content.  Frequently, the ISU outpaces SmartFilter&#039;s developer, Secure Computing, in identifying these sites, even though Secure Computing is a large public company whose success depends on keeping its black lists current.  By contrast, the ISU had only 44 employees as of 2001 to manage all Internet connectivity within Saudi Arabia as well as the filtering system.&lt;a href=&quot;#66&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;66&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;In 2004, 18 of 148 pages (12%) blocked locally by the ISU contained pornographic content.  Of these pages, only 2 had been categorized by SmartFilter as pornography by August 2004.  Reviewing these pages demonstrates the extraordinary difficulty facing any government or organization that wants to block pornography completely.  Previous research&lt;a href=&quot;#67&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;67&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;  demonstrates that pornographic Web sites monitor domain name registries for expiring registrations; they purchase these domains once they expire and place pornographic content on their pages.  Unlike the situation the prior research, where the co-opted domain redirected users to another pornographic site (which might already be included on a black list), the pages we investigated displayed the pornographic content at the new domain name - the owners had copied the material to the new domain.&lt;a href=&quot;#68&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;68&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;   Thus, blocking all Internet pornography requires constant surveillance of expiring and expired domains.   &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;Saudi Arabia devotes significant effort to this task and does it quite well.  The majority of this type of site we tested had been re-registered between November 2003 and February 2004; all were accessible in either 2002 or 2003, but blocked in July 2004.  These sites&#039; previous content included information from record labels, local churches, a &quot;guide to Jewish people worldwide,&quot; ethnic newspapers, and the Portugese consulate in Toronto.&lt;a href=&quot;#69&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;69&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;   This diverse content was replaced by pornography within 7 months of the domain names&#039; re-registration; this rapid change indicates that pornographic content distributors pursue attractive, expiring domains with dedication and alacrity.  Saudi Arabia&#039;s efforts to block these sites are consistent with an April 2001 report indicating ISU was &quot;looking for a mechanism to get immediate information on all sites as soon as they open to screen them for immoral content.&quot;&lt;a href=&quot;#70&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;70&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;   ISU&#039;s mechanism may not be immediate, but it is remarkably fast at detecting and filtering new pornographic content.  Overall, Saudi Arabia successfully blocks most pornographic Web content, and its rapid detection of new porn demonstrates the Kingdom&#039;s commitment to filtering this material.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;b. Drugs&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;The Saudi government actively seeks to block drug-related sites, especially those promoting illegal drug use.  In 2004, 86% of the drug sites we tested were blocked.  As with pornography, the Saudi ISU staff manually added a number of these sites (25 URLs, representing 17% of locally-blocked pages) to the black list before SmartFilter detected them.  Saudi Arabia distinguishes between pro-drug and drug abuse sites fairly well, blocking only 5% of substance abuse sites we tested.  We conclude that ISU aggressively seeks to block drug pages, making it difficult to access pro-drug use sites in Saudi Arabia.  &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;c. Gambling&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;Saudi Arabia heavily blocks gambling sites and relies on SmartFilter to do so.  We tested a short list of gambling sites in 2004 and found 93% of these pages blocked, all by SmartFilter.  We did not find local blocking of gambling sites, indicating satisfaction with SmartFilter&#039;s success rate or a slightly lower degree of concern with gambling than with drugs or pornography. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;d. Circumvention Tools: Proxies and Encryption Sites&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;Saudi Arabia protects its Internet filtering by blocking access to tools that provide users with prohibited content.  Filtering regimes must disable access to circumvention methods, such as alternative Web proxy servers, to succeed.  The ISU understands this potential weakness, as internal presentations from 2001 demonstrate: &quot;Once KACST knows the address of [public] proxies they get added to the black list.&quot;&lt;a href=&quot;#71&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;71&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;   We found 21 blocked anonymizer and encryptions sites; all were added to the black list locally by the ISU.&lt;a href=&quot;#72&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;72&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;   Saudi Arabia clearly understands the risk circumvention tools pose to filtering and acts to prevent it.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;e. Religious Conversion&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;Saudi Arabia also concentrates on blocking sites that attempt to convert its citizens or to introduce them to other faiths, as demonstrated by significant local blocking by the ISU.  We found 148 such sites locally blocked.  This filtering echoes the Kingdom&#039;s earliest concerns about the Internet as a tool to proselytize Saudi citizens.  The largest locally blocked group of these sites (22%) concerned relationships between Christians and Muslims.  Blocked sites in this area are frequently available in Arabic, and also include sites ostensibly encouraging dialogue between the Christian and Islamic religions.  We believe this concern also explains blocking of Apologetics sites that focus on &quot;explaining Islam.&quot;   Some noteworthy blocked sites include:&lt;a href=&quot;#73&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;73&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;div align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
&lt;table border=&quot;1&quot; cellpadding=&quot;3&quot; cellspacing=&quot;2&quot; width=&quot;650&quot; bordercolor=&quot;#000000&quot;&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td align=&quot;right&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td align=&quot;right&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td align=&quot;center&quot; colspan=&quot;3&quot;&gt;Blocked?&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Site&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Sample Quote From Site&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2002&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2003&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2004&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.submission.org&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;www.submission.org &lt;/a&gt;(13 pages tested)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&quot;Your best source for ISLAM  (SUBMISSION) on the Internet&quot;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Y&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;N/A&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Y&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://answering-islam.org&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;answering-islam.org&lt;/a&gt;(13 pages tested)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&quot;A Christian-Muslim Dialog&quot;; site is operated by evangelical Christians&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Y&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Y&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Y&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.thekoran.com&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;www.thekoran.com&lt;/a&gt;(2 pages tested)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&quot;Christian resources about Islam&quot;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Y&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;N/A&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Y&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://members.aol.com/alnour&quot; target=&quot;_bl